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Introduction
Humans and other great apes are similar in so many ways. We share an extended
immaturity and intense infant-caregiver relationships, group living situations, cultural
transmission of technology, and many emotions and cognitive capacities. Yet the
communities of nonhuman apes are also very different from human communities.
Humans build lasting tools, and store them to use later. We build permanent sleeping and
living structures. We cook our food. We have courts of law and prisons and ethics
books. There are vast technological differences between humans and nonhuman great
apes. What is it that accounts for such a difference? On one account, one central
difference between humans and other apes is that only humans develop the ability to
mindread, the ability to see that others have beliefs that could be true or false which
permits joint attention and shared intentions. For example, Michael Tomasello takes
mindreading (along with cooperation and having shared goals) that permits the
development of cumulative culture, so that technological advances can spread through a
society and future generations can continuously improve upon those advances (Tomasello
2008). And, Kim Sterelny suggests that our hominin ancestors thrived in an
apprenticeship culture where naïve individuals were given the opportunity to learn from a
master, and the master knew how to offer the apprentice the appropriate projects, tools,
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and materials as her skill sets improved—which of course was facilitated by a developing
mindreading capacity (Sterelny, 2012).
An idea that emerges is that only humans can be teachers, builders, or judges
because only humans understand their own reasoning patterns and the evidence they have
for their beliefs, and only human realize this about others in such a way that allows them
to form the collaborative projects needed for complex culture. This requires
mindreading capacities and realizing that some of our beliefs turn out to be false, or lack
evidence, while others turn out to be true. Retaining the true beliefs and discarding the
false ones is a generally advantageous evolutionary strategy. And it is traditionally taken
to be a requirement for an autonomous agent, one who acts deliberately, and hence is
responsible for her actions. Autonomous agents are the only sorts of creatures who can
truly be moved by moral norms.
In this paper I will offer an alternative account of the relationship between
mindreading and the development of community social norms and individual autonomous
agency. Mindreading is not needed for teaching, developing some cumulative culture, or
agency. Rather, I have argued that the foundational role for mindreading is based in its
usefulness for explaining behavior (Andrews 2009, 2012). It is the need to explain
behavior that drove the evolution of mindreading, and this, in turn, required a prior
understanding of social norms. Looking at the behavior of the nonhuman great apes in
this light, it appears that the core elements required for agency are fairly well established
in chimpanzee communities. One consequence of this position is that mindreading
should not be a requirement for either moral or legal standing.
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The benefits of mindreading
Mindreading is one aspect of a theory of mind. Theory of mind refers most
generally to the ability to attribute mental states of various sorts to other to others. The
interest in theory of mind was for a long time focused on the ability to attribute false
beliefs to others (Dennett 1978; Bennett 1978; Harman 1978; Wimmer and Perner 1983),
but now it includes understanding others’ perceptual states (such as what others see or
hear (Hare et al. 2000; Hare et al. 2003; Flombaum & Santos 2005; Hare et al. 2006;
Melis et al. 2006; Kaminski et al. 2006; Lurz 2011)), goals (Uller 2004), intentions
(Tomasello et al. 2005), or knowledge states (Hare et al. 2001; Kuroshima et al. 2002,
2003; Kaminski et al. 2008). What all these states share is their unobservable nature, so
the story goes. Such mental states are purported to be theoretical entities whose existence
must be inferred. While almost no one believes that apes can attribute propositional
attitudes such as beliefs (Call & Tomasello 2008), many claim that apes can attribute
some of these other mental states.
Despite the growing number of states of mind being investigated, most parties
agree that attributing these states of mind is beneficial for predicting behavior, and that
mindreading is particularly advantageous, since it permits the attribution of states of mind
such as belief states which the attributor knows may be false. Having this ability allows
one to try to manipulate a competitor by giving him a false beliefs, which would then lead
the competitor to act contrary to his own interests (and, importantly, in the manipulator’s
own interests). The view has been recently described in this way: for mindreading to be
advantageous, it must offer some benefit, and a benefit for a mindreading animal is
knowing what other animals’ behavior will be (Lurz 2011).
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I aim to challenge the widespread assumption that the benefit of mindreading is in
predicting behavior. Rather, since predicting behaivor can be accomplished using a large
variety of techniques that don’t require thinking about what others think or believe, it is
in explaining behavior in where mindreading offers an advantage (Andrews 2009; 2012).
When one has an explanation for someone’s behavior, one knows how to act
appropriately given that explanation, and nothing could be more advantageous than that.
Of course, once one have explained someone’s behavior, it is possible to generate
plausible predictions about future behavior, or at least to limit the domain of expected
behaviors. But it is the understanding of the other individual, rather than a simple ability
to predict, that offers the advantage. And some explanations of behavior can only be
given in terms of their beliefs.
To illustrate, consider being approached by an individual who is talking to
himself, acting jittery and otherwise appearing strangely. If you were to find this person
aversive given his strange behavior, and move away, you haven’t tried to understand him.
Rather, you have just consigned him to the out-group. But if you were curious, and tried
to understand his behavior by examining him more closely, you might see that he was
using a cool new gadget, and by learning something about his reasons for his behavior,
you learn something about new technology. So that is a contemporary example.
Consider now our hominin ancestors before the discovery of cooking. Meat was gained
at great effort, and so was presumably highly valued. Fire is destructive and would have
been constrained as much as possible. Putting the two together might seem like a terrible
thing to do. If our hominin ancestors ostracized the meat-cooker, rather than trying to
understand his motivation for cooking, they would have lost out on the increased
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nutrition cooked food offers. It is the willingness to allow individuals act anomalously,
and to seek to explain their odd behavior, that would offer an evolutionary advantage.
Note that many new technologies can be learned through the explanatory drive, without
active teaching or apprenticeship, or the ability to explain behavior. Opportunity learning
coupled with the drive to explain behavior could have led a juvenile hominin observing
the construction of a hand axe to pick up a flint and examine its affordances. The hand
axe becomes functionally transparent to him as he learns that it is sharp and can cut his
flesh, without anyone needing to teach him. As improvements in tools are made, these
new affordances can be discovered by examining the tools, coupled with observational
learning when the tools are in use. Thus, cumulative culture can also occur without
mindreading.
It is this drive to understand things in one’s environment that likely led to the
development of mindreading in humans. When the drive to explain is directed at other
beings, mindreading is the natural next step. But there is an important move in this story
that I have so far not emphasized, and it is this point that will be the focus of the
remained of the paper. In both examples, someone was acting oddly. It is odd behavior
that we seek to explain; there is no need to explain normal behavior. Here comes the
important step: to realize some behavior is worth explaining is to realize that it is not
normal, and this requires an understanding of what is normal, or what individuals should
be doing. It requires some understanding of social norms. Now of course not all
statistical regularities are social norms; using your left hand to eat will not lead others is
the West to seek an explanation, because there are no social norms against eating with the
left hand for Westerners. However, in other cultures where there is such a prohibition,
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and explanation would likely be sought (and offered). Those violations of statistical
norms that are the typical subject of explanatory interest are the ones that indicate the
existence of social norms. Among our hominin ancestors, there were likely social norms
about the proper treatment of fire. The first fire-cooker had to violate a norm to innovate
a new beneficial technology. And the others in the community had to recognize that he
had violated a norm, and ask themselves why he did it, for the practice to catch on.
The upshot is that a society in which mindreading might develop is a society that
already has social norms. But this claim might make some uneasy, for how could there
be moral norms without moral, and hence autonomous, agents? And how could there be
autonomous agents who don’t mindread—or more specifically, who lack the ability to
think about beliefs? I will turn to these questions now.

Agency and Mindreading
An autonomous agent knows that her actions have consequences, and she thinks
she can affect change in the world through her actions. While accounts differ, as a
foundation we can agree that "to be autonomous is to be one's own person, to be directed
by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed
externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one's authentic
self" (Christman 2009). Put this way, an autonomous agent is contrasted with an
individual whose every act is controlled by external forces, so an animal whose behavior
was completely controlled by, e.g., fixed action patterns (such that all behavioral
sequences are inflexible and determined by environmental stimuli) could not be an
autonomous agent. However, an animal might be an autonomous agent if his behavior is
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flexible and the result of internal cognitive processes rather than mere reflex or
association with environmental stimuli. For such animals, the question would then be
whether the internal processes are of the right sort.
There is a tradition in philosophy that would include mindreading (in terms of
understanding belief) among the processes required. Christine Korsgaard illustrates this
approach in her argument that animals lack autonomy. Because animals can’t mindread,
they cannot self-govern, i.e. they cannot decide whether an act is justified and then act
from that judgment rather than from one's desire. She writes:

What it [normative self-government] requires is a certain form of selfconsciousness: namely, consciousness of the grounds on which you propose to act
as grounds. What I mean is this: a nonhuman agent may be conscious of it as
fearful or desirable, and so as something to be avoided or to be sought. This is the
ground of his action. But a rational animal is, in addition, conscious that she fears
or desires the object, and that she is inclined to act in a certain way as a result.
That's what I mean by being conscious of the ground as a ground. She does not
just think about the object that she fears or even about its fearfulness but about her
fears and desires themselves (Korsgaard 2006, 113).
The argument that autonomy requires mindreading could go like this: in order to
have moral agency, one needs also to have autonomy. An autonomous agent is able to
act for reasons. And since acting for reasons requires the ability to recognize that one has
reasons for actions, and reasons for actions are sets of beliefs and desires that motivate
behavior, it follows that acting for reasons requires mindreading (of one’s self). Thus, the
worry arises that the moral agent must understand belief, and if nonhuman animals lack
the capacity they cannot be agents.
But, there are problems by setting the requirement so high. First, note that this
requirement excludes human children and many adult humans as autonomous agents. On
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this view, a moral agent has explicit knowledge of her reasons for action and the ability to
analyze them. It would follow that children, who do not seem to understand belief until
around 4 years old (Wellman et al. 2001), and who don't recognize some of the
limitations of belief attributions until mid-childhood (Apperly & Robinson 2001; 2002;
2003) are not autonomous agents. Worse yet, until adolescence humans are unable to
evaluate the reasons they may know they have (Pillow 1999; Morris 2000; Moshman
2004). And it is evaluating one’s reasons that is the hallmark of agency on Korsgaard’s
view.
The idea that normal adolescent humans are not autonomous agents flies in the
face of the typical approach to developmental moral psychology—and common sense—
according to which children have a very early entry into the domain of agency, even
though the range of intentional actions is more limited than that of adult humans. By
examining moral development starting with ten-year old boys, Kohlberg presumed that
there was moral reasoning of some sort at this age, and that assumption mirrors the
commonsense conception that children are moral agents, even though they cannot be held
responsible for all their actions (Kohlberg 1981). That we recognize children as not fully
responsibility for their actions is reflected in their special legal status. Since children are
still developing their cognitive capacities and their ability to control their impulses and
emotions, children are limited in what they can do. Given the acceptance of the "ought
implies can" principle, children enjoy this special status. But this doesn't mean that
children are not agents, and that their behavior cannot be categorized as good or bad.
Korsgaard’s requirement that agents have explicit knowledge of their reasons and
are able to analyze those reasons also runs into problems when we consider adult human
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cognition. Research on adult moral reasoning suggests that adults do not generally
consider their reasons when making moral judgments (Haidt 2001). Korsgaard may
respond that the requirement is only that an agent can consider her grounds for action,
which is consistent with the findings that humans very often do not consider their reasons
for their moral judgments. However, to take this position as a response to Haidt's
findings would be to accept that humans are not living up to their moral obligations most
of the time, and that most of our actions cannot be understood as autonomous.
If the standard is too high for many humans, it shouldn’t be surprising that the
standard is also too high for apes. Rather than taking this as an admission that apes aren’t
agents because they don’t mindread, we can take it as evidence that the requirements for
autonomy stated by Korsgaard are too high for the type of agency we are concerned with;
we want to find an account of agency that can be fulfilled by very young children, since
such children already have some understanding of social norms (which, as you may
recall, is what we’re really interested in here). Instead we should look at an account of
agency that is inclusive of these young children.
Consider again Christman’s account of autonomy as "to be autonomous is to be
one's own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics
that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be
considered one's authentic self" (Christman 2009). We can appeal to this definition in
order to ask about the cognitive capacities required, and whether children have them, and
if so, whether apes do as well. Let's focus on two aspects of this definition in turn; first
we'll look at being directed by internal considerations, and then we'll turn to the issue of
being one's own person.
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What does it mean to be directed by internal considerations rather than those that
are externally imposed? Let me suggest a sufficient condition: the ability to distinguish
intentional from unintentional action. An intentional action is done purposefully, and
would often be described as being done for reasons. If someone can sort intentional
actions from other kinds of actions, then there is at least an implicit recognition that these
two kinds of actions are different, and that some actions are the responsibility of the
agent, and others are not. If one can distinguish internal considerations from external
ones in others, there is every reason to expect that one could do so for one’s self as well.
There is evidence that apes have the cognitive capacities for identifying
intentional behavior. For example, there is evidence that chimpanzees understand that
others have mental states such as seeing, and that seeing motivates individuals to act
(Hare et al. 2000; Hare et al. 2001; Plooij 1978; Goodall 1986). There is also evidence
that chimpanzees understand goals and intentionality (Uller 2004; Tomasello &
Carpenter 2005; Warneken & Tomasello 2006). For example, Claudia Uller found that
chimpanzees, like human children (Gergely et al. 1995), seem to perceive the behavior of
geometric shapes moving in the right way as intentional (Uller 2004). For both humans
and chimpanzees, a violation of expectation paradigm was used to measure the subjects'
responses. While Gergely concluded that the infants' surprise response to "irrational"
behavior suggests that they attribute goals and rationality, Uller's conclusion was more
circumspect, even though her infant chimpanzees subjects responded in the same way as
the human infants. She concludes that chimpanzees, at least, have an understanding of
agency.
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This finding concerning infant chimpanzees is consistent with other experimental
studies of intentionality attribution. Call and colleagues found that chimpanzees are more
impatient with humans who are unwilling to give them food compared with humans who
are unable to give them food; they beg more from the capable person who is unwilling
than they beg from the person who is unable to access the visible food (Call et al. 2004).
Warneken & Tomasello found that chimpanzees respond appropriately to the
communicative gestures of human caregivers (Warneken & Tomasello 2006). While
engaged in what appeared to be informal social interactions with the experimenter, the
chimpanzees would be tested on their ability to respond to a nonverbal request for help.
In one condition, the experimenter dropped an object and requested that a chimpanzee
pick it up, which she readily did.
Apes’ understanding of intentionality has also been investigated by looking at
contingent responsivity. For example, a chimpanzee named Cassie responded differently
when being imitated by his caregiver than he did when his caregiver engaged in nonimitative behavior (Nielsen et al. 2005). Like human infants, Cassie would systematically
vary his behavior while closely watching the imitator. Nielsen and colleagues describe
one bout of behavior while Cassie was being imitated: "Cassie poked his finger out of
the cage, wiped the ground in front of him, picked up a piece of straw and placed it in his
mouth, pressed his mouth to the cage, then poked his finger out of the cage again"
(Nielsen et al. 2005, 34). Such repetitive sequences were the norm when Cassie was
being imitated, but not when the caregiver engaged in non-imitative behavior or no
behavior at all. Cassie's response demonstrates that he was aware that his caregiver was
acting purposefully, further evidence that the chimpanzee has a notion of agency.
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As well, research on natural pedagogy and ostensive communicative cues could
offer additional information about apes’ ability to recognize intentional agency in others.
Csibra suggests that in humans, ostensive cues that lead infants to come to understand
intentional communication are direct gaze, infant-directed speech, and contingent
responsivity or turn-taking (Csibra 2010). We know that direct gaze does occur in
chimpanzee mother-infant dyads (Bard et al. 2005), and as reviewed above there is
evidence that apes test contingencies in order to determine whether actions are intentional
or not. Mother-infant ape research can investigate parallels of these ostensive cues in the
development of ape communication.
Now, on to the second aspect of Christman's definition. What does it mean to be
one's own person, and act from one's authentic self? One interpretation is that an
authentic self is one that is self-created, rather than given to the agent fully formed. To
create one's self requires the ability to deliberately change oneself. There are various
ways in which one can act to change or control her behavior. One way of changing
oneself is to work things out in the space of reasons. But other ways would be to develop
habits of behavior and to self-modulate emotional responses.
As far as I know, the ability to self-create by purposefully changing oneself has
not been given direct attention by great ape researchers. However, there are some
findings that suggest great apes do act to improve themselves in various ways. For
example, the social learning literature indicates that great ape species do learn from
observing others' behavior (Whiten 2000, Tomasello et al. 1987, Call & Tomasello 1994).
Orangutans will position themselves so that they are only a few inches away from the
behavior that they are observing, and will subsequently attempt the behavior themselves
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(Call & Tomasello 1994). Some scientists think that great apes practice behaviors in
order to develop competences (Anne Russon, pers. communication). We have clear
evidence that apes spend years engaged in complicated tasks like nut-cracking and
cooperative hunting before they become proficient, and there is certainly valuable
information about the role of practice in the development of such skills. More research
on the question of practice in the learning research can help to determine whether and to
what extent the great apes act to purposefully change themselves.
Two other areas of research that are ripe for exploring the question of great ape
self-improvement:
Personality. The field of cross-species personality research has identified six
personality factors in chimpanzees (King & Figueredo 1997) and five factors for
orangutans (Weiss, King, & Perkins 2006). While the initial goal of this research was to
determine whether there are personality differences in other species, and what the
personality factors consist of, future work could be on changes in personality and the
events and behaviors that drive personality changes. Given the research of Francys
Subiaul and colleagues, we know that chimpanzees can learn some of the traits of
unfamiliar humans by watching them observe the human interacting with another
chimpanzee (Subiaul et al. 2008). The question is whether individuals can categorize
themselves in the same way, and modify their behavior based on that knowledge. This
sort of investigation may further our understanding of whether apes or other animals take
steps toward something like self-improvement.
Teaching. Self-improvement is related to helping other improve, and any
evidence of pedagogy in apes can offer evidence that the apes also act to self-improve.
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Teaching has been operationally defined by Caro and Hauser (1992) as requiring the
teacher to modify her behavior only in the presence of a learner, such that the teacher
gains no immediate benefit from the behavior, and the learner acquires the skill being
demonstrated. There is some evidence for teaching under Caro and Hauser’s criteria for
three species: the ant species T. albipennis (Franks & Richardson 2006), meerkats
(Thornton & McAuliffe 2006) and pied babblers (Raihani & Ridley 2008). While there
are occasional anecdotes about teaching in apes, these are often very controversial (e.g.
Boesch 1991, 1993), and there have been no published systematic study of pedagogy in
apes. This may be due to the difficulty of observing that an instance of teaching fulfills
all three of Caro and Hauser’s criteria. Another way of investigating teaching in apes
would be to look more toward the mechanisms presumed to be at work, and look for
evidence of such mechanisms. For example, one could follow Cisbra and Gergeley’s
recent suggestions about natural pedagogy (which they think is unique to humans) and
look for the building blocks of teaching in attention monitoring, understanding of
reference, and acquisition of general knowledge in ape species (2006, 2011)

But what about prediction?
One might worry that none of the capacities discussed above can be sufficient
for being a moral agent, which requires agency that is socially directed. And, the
objection might go, to be a social agent, one has to predict behavior and, one needs to
mindread to be a good behavior predictor.
I hinted at my answer to this objection earlier. While I think it is true that on most
theories in normative ethics a moral agent has to be able to predict behavior, I don’t think
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mindreading is necessary for predicting the majority of human behaviors—and in fact,
when we do mindread we are much less likely to make accurate predictions. I have
argued that some of the presuppositions about human cognition that have been made in
the ape theory of mind research are been unwarranted (Andrews 2005, 2012). The
assumption that humans attribute beliefs and desires in order to predict simple behaviors
has had a huge influence on subsequent research, though it is by no means clear that
humans do need to attribute beliefs and desires to predict behavior. I have argued that
even in false belief cases and in deception cases, individuals can predict behavior using a
number of different heuristics which social psychologists have shown are present in
humans, including generalizations over past behavior, social roles, personality traits,
generalization from self, and stereotypes. Given that predicting behavior is usually seen
as being an important part of being a social agent, the ability to predict behavior without
attributing belief allows us to set aside this objection to seeing apes as intentional agents.

Conclusion
Whether or not apes have an understanding of other’s beliefs is an open question,
but it is one that need not be answered before answering the question of ape autonomy, or
the existence of social norms, pedagogy or cumulative culture in ape societies. We
already know that apes are able to discriminate intentional from nonintentional agents,
and there is evidence that apes may actively seek to self improve or to create themselves.
Such striving may sound rather high and mighty, but it need not be. Choosing a mate,
engaging in a dominance battle, increasing hunting territory (as described by Watts et al.
2006), and exposing one’s offspring to the technologies and practices of the community
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may all be seen as part of self-creation. When humans engage in such things, we often do
think of them in rich or evocative terms such as building a family, improving one’s lot in
life, seizing power, mothering, and so forth. But the descriptions are less important than
the acts themselves, and those we share with our other ape cousins. If we can come to see
other apes as agents who engage in self-creation, we will be less likely to exclude them
the moral and legal standing we grant human agents. This status doesn’t require
sophisticated cognitive capacities such as mindreading or language capacities.
I’ve suggested that a society in which mindreading might develop is a society that
already has social norms. We need not worry about moral norms existing without
mindreading, given an account of agency that consists of (a) recognizing intentional
agency and (b) active self-improvement. However, evidence that apes mindread will also
serve as evidence that they have moral norms, on the account I offer. Thus, not only the
evidence reviewed above but also evidence that apes understand others’ perceptual states,
informational states, and goals would also serve to defend the claim that they are agents
with social norms. Even understood as an ongoing research program, the current body of
evidence should make us think more than twice about continuing practices that treats
other apes as objects, rather than as subjects with rich individual and social lives. Using
apes as actors, as subjects in medical tests, or otherwise as objects for human enjoyment
does not respect their probable nature as agents with social norms. As scientists continue
examining ape behavior, the teachers, judges, and builders of our society should seek to
protect other apes from our overwhelming interest in them, by taking the default position
that other apes are autonomous agents with their own projects that need to be respected.
This suggests to me that we should grant other apes moral and legal standing, thereby
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demonstrating what humans can do with our ability to consider our own reasons for
action.
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